

Is Development Aid Securitised? Evidence from a Cross-Country Examination of Aid Commitments

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Abstract

How has the securitisation of development affected the distribution of bilateral development aid by sector? Over the past two decades, academics and development NGOs have become increasingly concerned about the impact of the securitisation of development. This debate has not, however, adequately addressed the impact of securitisation on actual aid commitments to key sectors. If aid commitments are influenced by securitisation this will have implications for the types of programmes funded by bilateral donors. This article examines whether and how securitisation has affected the distribution of UK, US, Danish and Swedish development aid by sector through investigating how conflict in aid-recipient states and the extent to which these states are perceived as a security threat, affect aid commitments to priority sectors; democratisation and peace, conflict and security. A mixed-methods approach analyses the policy discourse and aid commitments of the four bilateral donors. For the latter we use data from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System and the Uppsala University Conflict Data Programme, along with data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Global Terrorism Database in a cross-sectional time-series regression analysis. The new data produced indicate that the securitisation of development has had the most significant effect on aid commitments to states not affected by conflict and that the strategic importance of conflict-affected states and the domestic character of donor governments both influence the strength of aid securitisation. Given the concerns regarding aid for security purposes and donors'

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Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the British International Studies Association Conference and the International Political Science Association Conference and we thank participants for their encouragement and comments. We would also like to thank the Transnational Europe Research Cluster at the University of Portsmouth for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Portsmouth for the research grant which enabled us to complete this project. And finally, we would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and editors for their time.

policy discourse, bilateral donors should consider the need of current funding for conflict, peace and security programmes in states not affected by conflict and recognise the role of national security interests in decisions about the distribution of aid.

Keywords: security–development nexus; development aid; securitisation; conflict; post-conflict states; donor interest; democratisation; sector aid provision.

Introduction

Over the past 20 years, academics and development NGOs have become increasingly concerned that international development has become securitised (Duffield, 2001; Oxfam GB, 2011; McConnon, 2014; Brown & Gravingholt, 2016a). Within this literature, ‘securitisation of development’ is understood to mean that development agencies conceive of conflict and instability in the Global South as an international security threat. However, although the securitisation of development in the policy discourse has received substantial attention (Wilkin, 2002; Duffield, 2007; McConnon, 2014), how securitisation affects actual aid commitments remains understudied. In response, this article examines whether and how securitisation has influenced the distribution of UK, US, Swedish and Danish development aid by sector.

Using a mixed-methods analysis of data between 1995 and 2015,³ we find a tension between donors’ policy discourse that emphasises the need to invest in democratisation and conflict, peace, and security activities as key pillars of peacebuilding in conflict-affected states, and donors’ actual aid commitments. Using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and the Uppsala University Conflict Data Programme, we find that while donors have indeed increased aid to these sectors over the past two decades, the increases have not focused on conflict-affected states. Rather, donors have augmented aid commitments to conflict, peace and security activities mainly in states not affected by conflict. However, using data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and the Global Terrorism Database, we find that in some cases, bilateral aid commitments to conflict-affected states of high strategic interest to the donors are more likely to reflect the securitisation of development in the donors’ policy discourse. For example, under recent Conservative governments in the UK, conflict-affected states of higher strategic interest have been prioritised in the allocation of development aid to democratisation and conflict, peace, and security activities.

³The period 1995–2015 was chosen as quantitative aid data broken down by sectors before 1995 or after 2015 were not available at the time of research. The development policy discourse indicates that development began to be linked with security priorities towards the end of the 1990s.

As well as demonstrating disparity between donors' policy discourse and actual aid commitments, our findings make two further important contributions to understanding the impact of securitisation on aid flows. First, they suggest that the securitisation of development has had the most significant effect on aid to states not affected by conflict. Second, they illustrate that both the strategic importance of conflict-affected states and the domestic character of donor governments influence the strength of aid securitisation.

Securitisation of development

The securitisation of development *per se* is not new; during the Cold War, development and security concerns were indivisible, such that security concerns largely dictated development policy. After a brief period in which security concerns were delinked from development, including a reluctance by donors to engage in conflict zones (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2006, p. 340), the mid-1990s saw a resurgence of securitisation, but with two distinctions from the Cold War security–development nexus. First, there were two possible development paths during the Cold War and second, the enemy of national security was identified as capitalism or communism, with aid used for strategic purposes to contain one or the other. In the current manifestation of securitisation, conflict and instability in the Global South are perceived as a threat to the national security of Western donors and the only development path is that of liberal democracy (Thomas, 2001; Wilkin, 2002; Cliffe et al., 2003; Beall et al., 2005; Wilkinson, 2005; Woods, 2005; Duffield, 2010; Hettne, 2010; McConnon, 2014). Although securitisation as conceptualised by these authors owes a debt to the Copenhagen School's original understanding of securitisation,⁴ the latter argues for a legitimate widening of the traditional security framework to include, for example, economic or societal security, whereas the debate surrounding the securitisation of development tends to problematise underdevelopment as a security concern for Western states.

The security–development nexus is perceived within this literature to have had an effect upon the distribution of development aid. For instance, McConnon argues that the 'shift in discourse' has coincided with the 'prioritisation of fragile states in aid flows' and 'specific

⁴ First, the securitisation of development is a act of political will and a speech act in that it has survived the merging of the orthodox security and development discourses (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 26; Wilkin, 2002). Second, Buzan argues that it is not necessary for a real existential threat to exist for an issue to be securitised – only for the issue to be presented as such a threat (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 24). Similarly the securitisation of development literature argues that while the empirical evidence linking conflict and underdevelopment in the Global South with security in the Global North is weak, the policy discourse of development agencies assumes this link (Duffield, 2001; see also Stern & Öjendal, 2010).

programmes aimed at addressing [donor] security concerns' (2014, p. 1146; also Duffield, 2007, p. 126). Similarly, Brown and Gravingholt claim that 'international aid agencies have revised their aid strategies to reflect new security concerns and increased aid to strategic conflict-affected countries' (2016b, pp. 1-2; also Woods, 2005, p. 393; Beall et al., 2006, p. 55; Petrikova & Lazell, 2017). Development NGOs express similar concerns. Oxfam GB (2011, pp. 1-2) argues that in Europe and North America donors' 'military and security interests have skewed global aid spending', while Saferworld is concerned that donors' security interests may overshadow the wellbeing of vulnerable populations, particularly in fragile states (2011, p. 2).

The securitisation of development aid differs from earlier manifestations of donor self-interest in providing aid. Existing literature has linked donor aid commitments to bilateral trade (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009), favourable votes at the UN (Alesina & Dollar, 2000), Security Council seats (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006), and geographic proximity (Neumayer, 2005). In contrast, this article investigates how the securitisation of development – the idea that conflict and fragility in the Global South pose a threat to donors – has affected aid commitments. Specifically, we look at how securitisation has affected the *type* of programmes funded by aid. Unlike some previous studies, we do not examine specific donor–recipient relationships in a qualitative manner (as, for example, Brown and Gravingholt, 2016b) but, move beyond the existing literature to undertake a systematic quantitative cross-country investigation of aid to all recipients from four major Western donors: the UK, the US, Denmark, and Sweden.

These countries represent a range of OECD donors with varying security and development capabilities and concerns. The US and UK were chosen to represent large donors who, as key members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), have significant international security commitments (Petrikova, 2016). Denmark is also a NATO member but with a much smaller commitment, both in terms of international security and the size of its aid programme. Sweden is not part of NATO and, along with Denmark, has a strong tradition of altruism in its commitment to international development (Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006). Because the security and development commitments of the four donors vary substantially, our results shed light not only on the extent to which securitisation has influenced aid commitments, but also on whether it has affected donors in a similar way irrespective of their positions regarding NATO or international development traditions.⁵

⁵It is beyond the scope of this article to capture all possible representations of the securitisation of development; we could say, for example, that aid has been securitised when it is delivered by the military, or aligned with specific military objectives (as was the case in Afghanistan). Our purpose here, rather, is to further the understanding of the link between securitisation of development discourse and provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA), recognising that there may be other manifestations that also require further research.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we examine the development policy discourse of the four selected bilateral donors to establish how we may expect the securitisation of development to influence aid commitments. Based on the results of this analysis, in the second section we construct several testable hypotheses. Following this we introduce the article's theoretical framework, the data used and the empirical methods employed to analyse them. The final sections present our findings and discuss their policy and political implications.

Development policy discourse

What does the policy discourse suggest about the *type* of programmes that should be funded to strengthen the donors' national security? In order to answer this question, and thus construct our hypotheses, we identified the types of aid programmes highlighted by donors in their policy discourse as key to reducing conflict and building peaceful societies. This identification involved a systematic collection and analysis of development policy documents from our four donors over the last two decades. Major policy documents including government white papers and reports, speeches by international development ministers setting out overarching development strategies, and policy documents specifically dealing with conflict, security, and development were analysed. A complete list of these documents is included in the Appendix. Using qualitative-analysis software an iterative process of analysis was used with text coded to categories and patterns identified (Tracy, 2012).

Given the research question specified above, primary-cycle coding involved coding references to security, conflict/instability, and fragile states, as well as to refugee movements and terrorism etc., to ascertain how these concepts were understood in the discourse. Secondary-cycle coding aimed to identify patterns and links between these concepts – for example, how 'fragile states' are understood in relation to 'global security'. Secondary-cycle coding also sought to establish the types of programmes deemed appropriate in conflict-affected and post-conflict states. This eventually led to hierarchical coding of programmes where various codes were placed under umbrella categories to make sense of them. The results of this qualitative analysis are as follows.

Within the discourse of three of our selected bilateral donors, the securitisation of development is well-established and dates from the early 2000s. It broadly involves three related beliefs. The first is that underdevelopment and conflict in the Global South are mutually reinforcing (Danida, 2005, p. 17; DFID, 2005a, p. 3; 2005b, pp. 5-8; HM Treasury and DFID, 2015, pp. 3-5; 2012, p. 2; Greening, 2015a, pp. 7-8; 2015b, p. 2; USAID, 2013, pp. 8 & 29; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, 2016a, p. 7). All four donors agree on this point.

The second assumption is that instability and conflict in the Global South are sources of international insecurity (Danida, 2005, p. 9; DFID, 2005a, pp. 3-5; 2012, p. 2; USAID, 2005, p. v; 2011, p. 1; 2013, p. 30; Greening, 2015a, pp. 7-8; 2015b, p. 2). While strongly emphasised in DFID and USAID policy documents, this belief has been toned down in the most recent Danida (Denmark's Development Cooperation department) policy document (compare, for example, Danida, 2003 with The Danish Government, 2015). Unlike the other three donors, Swedish development discourse emphasises only the moral responsibility to support the poor and oppressed (Ohlsson 2000, p. 1; Persson & Karlson, 2003; Soder, 2005; Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2016a; 2016b, p. 9) and does not explicitly link these goals with Sweden's national security interests.

Supported by these first two ideas, the third assumption is that development aid can be used to enhance the donor's national security (i.e. the securitisation of development aid) (Danida, 2003, p. 2; DFID, 2010; USAID, 2011: Forward from the Administrator; USAID, 2013, i; HM Treasury & DFID, 2015, p. 3). Unsurprisingly, given their *raison d'être*, the agencies explicitly depict aid as a powerful tool which can reduce and prevent future conflict in the Global South. For DFID and USAID, the rationale for this is explicitly national security. As mentioned, a similar rationale is more prevalent in earlier Danish policy documents than in more recent ones, and is absent from Swedish development policy discourse.

According to the policy discourse of all four donors, reducing and preventing future conflict in the Global South requires two types of development interventions. The first seeks to encourage the development of democratic, inclusive societies, which respect human rights (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003; USAID, 2013, pp. 4, 9). Such programmes are 'critical to the U.S national interest' (ibid: 4) as they support efforts to combat terrorism and extremism (ibid: 9). Interventions promoting this 'golden thread of democracy' (HM Treasury & DFID, 2015, p. 11; see also Danida, 2012; USAID, 2013) include strengthening civil society and the rule of law, tackling marginalisation and exclusion, and advancing the rights and opportunities of women and girls (USAID, 2002, p. 106; 2013, p. 5; Greening, 2015b). According to USAID, these measures 'may be among the most important contributions that foreign assistance can make to conflict management and mitigation' (USAID, 2002, p. 106; see also USAID, 2013, p. 11).

The second type of development programmes that can contribute to the donors' national security are explicit conflict-prevention and resolution measures. These include the disarmament of civilians, reform of the security, police and justice sectors, and civilian 'peace-building' activities

(DFID, 2003; Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2003, p. 30; USAID, 2013, i; The Danish Government, 2015, pp. 1-5).⁶

In summary, the DFID and USAID policy documents strongly reflect the securitisation of development, i.e. the belief that development aid can and should be used in the national security interest of donors, underpinned by the assumption that conflict and instability in the Global South have the potential to undermine their security. This belief is less prevalent in more recent Danish policy documents and does not form a part of the Swedish discourse. All four donors, however, advocate the view that development aid can mitigate conflict and insecurity in the Global South through democratisation programmes and explicit conflict-prevention measures. For the UK, US, and Denmark, such development interventions are believed to directly contribute to their national security objectives.

Conflict and instability are understood to underpin activities, such as terrorism and transnational crime, that can threaten donors' national security and therefore the conflict status of states is key when assessing the levels of aid securitisation. However, we also recognise that within the pool of conflict-affected states some will be perceived as posing a potentially greater security threat than others. This is where our 'strategic interest' variable, explained below, comes in.

Theoretical framework and hypotheses

In order to assess the extent to which development practice reflects the policy discourse, we investigate whether the sectors donors identify as crucial to restoring peace and stability – aid to democratisation (hypothesis 1[H1]) and aid to conflict, peace, security (CPS) activities (hypothesis 2[H2]) – have been prioritised in aid commitments to conflict-affected states and whether this increased over time. As a second step in the analysis, in acknowledgment that some conflict-affected states are viewed as more strategically important to donors than others, we examine whether conflict-affected states that are of a higher security interest for the donor are prioritised in the allocation of democratisation (hypothesis 3[H3]) and conflict, peace, and security aid (hypothesis 4[H4]).

In order to provide a robust analysis, we use several methods to examine the extent to which aid commitments reflect policy discourse in prioritising democratisation and conflict, peace, and security activities in conflict-affected countries (H1 and H2). We look at trends in the provision of aid, both as volume per capita and as a proportion of all aid committed to the key sectors, first

⁶ Providing development aid to sectors other than democratisation and conflict prevention, such to health (Calain & Sa'Da, 2015) or education (Howell & Lind, 2009), has occasionally also been depicted by donors as strengthening their national security. However, the emphasis on the importance of conflict-prevention and democratisation aid to sustainable peace has been significantly more consistent, which is why we focus on those particular types of aid.

among all aid recipients and second among conflict-affected states only. Positive results for conflict-affected states would be suggestive of the securitisation of development aid.

In addition, we investigate the extent to which conflict affects how much democratisation and CPS aid states receive from donors, in per-capita as well as proportional terms, and how this has changed over time. We expect that conflict-affected countries receive more conflict, peace, and security aid than countries not affected by conflict and are interested here in whether this trend has increased more rapidly in conflict-affected states compared to peaceful states. A more rapid increase in democratisation aid to conflict-affected countries may also indicate that development aid has been securitised.

Assessing empirically whether donors favour conflict-affected states which are of higher strategic interest to them in allocating democratisation and CPS aid (H3 and H4) is methodologically more straightforward. Here, we analyse the impact of the donors' strategic interests on their aid commitments in the key sectors in conflict-affected countries and the impacts' evolution over the past two decades.

We do not construct a formal hypothesis regarding any differences between the four donors but in view of their distinct policy discourse, we expect to find Swedish aid, and Danish aid in more recent years, to be less 'securitised' than that provided by the US and the UK, particularly with regard to the influence of donors' strategic interests.

Data and methodology

Dependent variable

In testing hypotheses related to the provision of democratisation aid (H1 and H3), the dependent variable is alternatively a) the per-capita volume of aid in 2014 US dollars and b) the proportion of all aid committed to *democratisation activities*, classified by the CRS of the OECD aid database under the code 152: I.5.a. These activities include support to democratic participation and civil society, legal and judicial development, legislatures and political parties, elections, anti-corruption, human rights, women's rights, and free media.

When testing hypotheses related to CPS aid (H2 and H4), the dependent variable is either the per-capita volume of aid, in 2014 US dollars, or the proportion of all aid committed to recipients' conflict, peace, and security activities (CRS code 152: I.5.b). The category includes aid for security-system management and reform; civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and resolution;

participation in international peacekeeping operations; reintegration and small-arms and light-weapons control; removal of landmines; and work with child soldiers.⁷

We examine aid commitments rather than disbursements, for two reasons. First, OECD data on aid disbursements to different sectors are unreliable and available only after 2002 (Petrikova, 2016). Second, aid commitments are subject to fewer arbitrary executive decisions and are less influenced by recipients' administrative capacity than aid disbursements. Consequently, they reflect donors' intentions more closely than disbursements (Berthelemy, 2006).

Main independent variables

The focus of the donor development discourse, reviewed earlier, is fragile and conflict-affected states. Within this category, some states are strategically more important to donors than others. The main independent variables in the empirical analysis are hence 'conflict status' and 'strategic interest'.

A state's conflict status is approximated via two distinct measures. The first is conflict intensity from the Uppsala University Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), which rates countries from 0 (no conflict) to 2 (high conflict intensity). The second variable, post-conflict,⁸ is a binary variable of our own design, where countries are considered to be post-conflict for five years following a descent from 2 to 1 and three years following a descent from 1 to 0 on the UCDP conflict-intensity scale. The two separate variables are in some empirical tests combined into a binary variable called conflict status, which takes a value of 1 for any country in conflict or post-conflict.⁹

The 'strategic interest' of each recipient state for the donor is operationalised using a variable composed of the number of refugees a donor received from the recipient country in one year, the number of arms exported by that donor to the recipient country in that year, and the number of casualties from terrorist attacks against citizens of OECD/EU member states in the recipient country that year. Data on refugees were obtained from the UNHCR database, data on arms transfers from SIPRI and data on terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database. The

⁷ The democratisation activities together with the conflict, peace, and security activities constitute the government and civil society sector of aid provision within the CRS database.

⁸ The post-conflict variable is included because donors understand the post-conflict phase as a crucial time for peacebuilding activities and strengthening recipients' governance. This could be because countries in active conflict may lack the capacity necessary to use development aid properly and because providing aid in conflict situations may require donors to take political decisions about which side of the conflict to support.

⁹ Initially, we used two further measures – the number of conflict-related deaths per country per year (available from UCDP) and the Fragile States Index rating compiled by the Fund for Peace since 2006. In the final models, we decided against using the number-of-deaths variable due to its consistently similar but slightly less significant results than those obtained with the conflict-intensity measure. We chose not to use the Fragile States Index because it was not available before 2006, which severely limited our sample.

three data components were first standardised to 0-1000 values, summed, and finally re-coded into a 0-3 scale, with 0 signifying low and 3 high strategic interest for the donor.

These three components were chosen based on what donors identify as national security threats that can be mitigated through development aid as well as on their less explicit geo-political interests. Both migration and terrorism have been identified as the key global challenges in the development policy discourse of the UK, US, and Denmark as well as in the UK's latest strategic defence and security review (HM Government, 2015). In addition, arms exports have been commonly used in aid literature as the best approximation of donors' geopolitical strategic interests (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Neumayer, 2003b).

Control variables

Following existing literature on aid allocation (e.g. Neumayer, 2003a; Nielsen, 2013; Petrikova, 2016), our model controls for recipient needs and donor interests other than security. Keeping in mind our overall focus on aid committed to government and civil society (conflict, peace, and security and democratisation aid fall under this remit) rather than total aid flows more commonly analysed by researchers, the most obvious recipient need is to address poor governance, since countries with poor governance can in theory benefit more from donor investments in their government and civil society sectors (Winters & Martinez, 2015). We operationalise governance through the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). We also control for GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, and population size, both obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI).

Turning to donor interests other than security, trade flows with recipients may influence donors' decisions regarding the proportion of aid committed to activities under the government and civil society sector – such investments could be seen as an incentive or reward to important trading partners. Therefore, we include a measure of bilateral export and import flows with each donor, obtained from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics. We also control for former colonial relations. Descriptive statistics of the control variables are displayed in Table 6 in the Appendix.

Dataset and empirical methods

The dataset used in this study covers 145 aid recipient countries for 21 years (1995–2015), which constitute the time span for which sector-aid data were available at the time of writing. In order to account for bureaucratic inertia in aid provision, as well as the reality of aid committed to projects and programmes for several years in advance, the data are not analysed annually but averaged over seven three-year periods. As a robustness test, however, we also examine the


relationship between conflict-affected states and aid to democratisation and to conflict, peace, and security activities using two-year and four-year averaged data. Unlike annual data, the averaged data according to the Arellano-Bond (1991) tests are not serially correlated.

The selection of the appropriate empirical estimator is hence driven primarily by the censored nature of the data: they are downward-censored by 0, i.e. cannot take negative values (the proportional measures of aid are also upward-censored by 1). Accordingly, we use panel Tobit regressions with random dyad effects (discussed in more detail by, for instance, Nielsen, 2013). All the regression models were estimated using robust standard errors.

Summary statistics

Table 1 displays trends in the main dependent and independent variables for the first and last time periods examined. Of the four donors, only Denmark did not commit on average more total aid per recipient country in 2013-2015 than in 1995-1997. The UK and the US more than doubled their average contributions per recipient. All four donors increased their per-capita and relative aid commitments to conflict, peace, and security activities and, with the exception of the US in relative and the UK in per-capita terms, to democratisation. This has translated into an overall increase in the proportion of Danish, Swedish, and UK aid flows to recipients' government and civil society sector (combination of democratisation and CPS aid) between 1995-1997 and 2013-2015; meanwhile, the proportion of US aid to this sector decreased considerably (see Figure 1).


Figure 1. Proportion of aid committed to the government and civil society sector



Source: CRS

Regarding the key independent variables, the average conflict intensity declined over the two decades examined, from 0.26 to 0.18, while the proportion of post-conflict countries increased, from 7 to 16 per cent. Figure 2 displays the temporal evolution of the four donors' proportional aid commitments to conflict-affected countries and demonstrates that while Danish and Swedish contributions rose over time, US and UK contributions decreased. Nevertheless, the UK still committed proportionally most aid to conflict-affected countries in 2013-2015 and, in line with the UK's current strategy to allocate more than half of DFID's annual budget to fragile countries (DFID, 2015), this figure is now likely to be even higher.

Figure 2. Proportion of aid committed to conflict-affected countries



Source: CRS

Turning to the strategic interest variable, in the first time period, the average aid recipient held the most strategic interest for Sweden, followed by the US, the UK, and Denmark. By 2013-2015, the average strategic interest comparatively declined for all donors except the UK.

Table 1. Summary statistics of the dependent and key independent variables

	Wave1: 1995-1997				Wave 6: 2013-2015			
Variable	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>Total aid per recipient (mill USD)</i>								
UK	16.50	46.34	0.00	451.82	34.99	105.02	0.00	1054.40
US	63.06	218.72	0.02	1736.69	151.03	285.51	0.02	2341.88
Denmark	16.46	22.47	0.00	94.07	13.88	26.64	0.00	173.59
Sweden	8.75	15.26	0.01	84.31	11.48	19.95	0.01	98.72
<i>Avg aid to conflict, peace, and security per capita</i>								
UK	0.001	0.01	0.00	0.07	0.080	0.26	0.00	1.83
US	0.047	0.25	0.00	1.88	0.230	0.66	0.00	4.54
Denmark	0.008	0.04	0.00	0.26	0.029	0.10	0.00	0.55
Sweden	0.019	0.12	0.00	1.10	0.048	0.23	0.00	2.32
<i>Avg aid to democratisation per capita</i>								
UK	0.547	5.58	0.00	20.00	0.191	0.55	0.00	5.36
US	1.131	2.33	0.00	16.24	4.155	23.94	0.00	268.15
Denmark	0.154	0.59	0.00	4.43	0.248	0.80	0.00	6.39
Sweden	0.271	0.74	0.00	4.65	0.350	0.76	0.00	4.59
<i>Avg ratio of aid to conflict, peace and security</i>								
UK	0.001	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.034	0.08	0.00	0.43
US	0.007	0.03	0.00	0.28	0.021	0.05	0.00	0.37
Denmark	0.016	0.09	0.00	0.72	0.039	0.13	0.00	1.00
Sweden	0.012	0.05	0.00	0.34	0.028	0.09	0.00	0.62
<i>Avg ratio of aid to democratisation</i>								
UK	0.090	0.15	0.00	0.60	0.117	0.17	0.00	1.00
US	0.244	0.26	0.00	0.97	0.202	0.25	0.00	0.99
Denmark	0.113	0.20	0.00	0.81	0.383	0.38	0.00	1.00
Sweden	0.325	0.36	0.00	1.00	0.370	0.30	0.00	1.00
<i>Conflict variables</i>								
Conflict intensity	0.26	0.49	0.00	2.00	0.18	0.44	0.00	2.00
Post-conflict	0.07	0.17	0.00	1.00	0.16	0.34	0.00	1.00
<i>Strategic interest</i>								
UK	1.43	1.28	0.00	3.00	1.56	1.13	0.00	3.00
US	1.55	1.20	0.00	3.00	1.49	1.04	0.00	3.00
Denmark	1.23	1.11	0.00	3.00	0.73	1.01	0.00	3.00
Sweden	1.64	1.26	0.00	3.00	1.33	1.20	0.00	3.00
No. of countries	122				137			

Summary statistics of the control variables, shown in Table 6 in the Appendix, demonstrate that aid recipients' GDP per capita along with donors' exports to and imports from aid-recipient countries on average increased in the two decades under observation. However, there has been little improvement in governance indicators.

Results

Aid for democratisation (hypothesis 1)

To what extent, then, has democratisation aid been prioritised in conflict-affected states? If aid commitments reflect the discourse emphasising the importance of democratisation aid to reducing conflict and maintaining peace (H1), aid commitments to democratisation activities – both per capita and proportionally – in conflict-affected states should have experienced growth over time absolutely as well as relative to countries not affected by conflict. Tables 2 and 4 show this to be only partially the case.

As Table 2 illustrates, time has had a significant positive effect on democratisation aid flows. However, this is the case not only for conflict-affected states but for all aid recipients, perhaps mirroring the general increase in total aid volumes. The UK and Denmark, unlike Sweden and the US, also amplified the proportional provision of democratisation aid but again among all aid recipients rather than only in conflict-affected states. Comparison of the marginal rates of change in democratic aid commitments between conflict-affected and states not affected by conflict, summarised in Table 4 (based on Table 7 in the Appendix), show that on average, there has been no significant difference between the two groups. Only the UK increased provision of democratisation aid per capita more in conflict-affected states, while Denmark's provision of democratisation aid proportionally declined in conflict-affected states compared to non-conflict countries.

Table 2. Effects of time, conflict, and strategic interest on democratisation aid commitments

DV: Democratisation aid	Denmark				Sweden				UK				US			
	Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion	
	All	Conf-off.	All	Conf-off.	All	Conf-off.	All	Conf-off.	All	Conf-off.	All	Conf-off.	All	Conf-off.	All	Conf-off.
Time	2.32E-08	2.02E-08	0.033	0.028	1.98E-08	2.96E-08	0.005	0.005	1.73E-08	7.75E-08	0.010	0.013	9.25E-08	2.53E-07	-0.003	0.000
Conflict	5.48	3.24	6.13	4.14	4.08	3.85	1.15	1.34	1.28	4.26	4.33	5.26	3.78	3.89	1.38	0.20
Post-conflict	3.43E-09	-0.048	-0.048	0.04	-1.16E-08	0.17	-0.091	0.13	-2.62E-08	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	-1.14E-06	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015
Strategic interest	1.80E-08	-6.69E-08	-0.104	0.019	1.33E-08	-6.47E-08	-0.126	-0.056	7.63E-08	-3.68E-07	-0.025	-0.040	-6.88E-07	-1.92E-06	-0.043	-0.057
WGI	0.41	0.83	1.27	0.24	0.16	0.66	2.84	1.25	0.28	1.50	0.77	0.98	1.58	2.28	1.35	2.56
PPp (log)	1.80E-08	1.28E-08	-0.001	0.029	8.12E-08	5.91E-08	0.029	-0.027	1.50E-07	4.32E-07	0.031	0.013	7.48E-08	-5.30E-08	-0.006	-0.007
Imports (log)	0.61	0.31	0.00	0.80	2.11	0.83	1.11	0.89	1.07	2.18	1.36	0.51	0.37	0.08	0.43	0.39
Exports (log)	-1.68E-07	-2.93E-07	-0.017	0.360	-1.98E-07	-4.83E-07	-0.078	0.097	-2.92E-08	4.52E-07	-0.026	0.021	1.33E-07	3.22E-06	-0.120	-0.083
Population (log)	2.42	2.55	0.17	3.32	2.26	3.41	1.13	1.42	0.12	1.32	0.75	0.36	0.43	1.38	3.65	2.22
Colony	-2.12E-07	-2.87E-08	-0.023	0.077	-1.83E-07	-1.12E-07	0.001	0.084	-4.86E-07	-6.86E-07	0.017	-0.001	-1.06E-06	-9.04E-08	-0.089	0.079
N	481	209	481	209	666	290	666	290	798	304	798	304	843	302	843	270

The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at $p < 0.10$. Regressions controlled also for region and time effects.

Overall, the results suggest that the donors increased the provision of democratisation aid to conflict-affected countries in the past two decades in absolute terms and the UK and Denmark also proportionally. However, this increase has not focused on conflict-affected countries and is not an obvious manifestation of aid securitisation, with the exception of the UK. For the UK, growth in per-capita commitments of democratisation aid to conflict-affected states significantly exceeded commensurate growth in non-conflict-affected countries over the last two decades. The proportional allocation of UK democratisation aid to conflict-affected states also increased faster than to non-conflict states (although this difference is not statistically significant).¹⁰

Aid to conflict, peace, and security (hypothesis 2)

Development policy identifies aid to conflict, peace, and security activities as the second key strategy to reduce conflict in the Global South and thereby strengthen donors' own security. To what extent have aid commitments reflected this discourse? Again, the answer is 'only partially', as Tables 3 and 4 indicate.

Without exception, the donors increased per-capita and proportional aid commitments to conflict, peace, and security activities between 1995-1997 and 2003-2015. However, this increase occurred not only in conflict-affected countries but among all aid recipients (Table 3). As expected, over the two decades examined, conflict-affected states (whether in active conflict or post-conflict) received on average more CPS aid than their peaceful counterparts. However, of the four donors only Denmark increased CPS aid provision to conflict-affected states faster than to non-conflict-affected countries; for the UK, there was no significant change over time, and the US and Sweden actually reduced the proportion of CPS aid provision in conflict-affected as opposed to non-conflict-affected recipients. Accordingly, from this perspective only Denmark has exhibited aid patterns indicative of aid securitisation.¹¹

¹⁰ From control variables, GDP per capita and governance quality have both a consistent negative effect on the proportion of aid allocated to democratisation, aligning with our theoretical expectation vis-à-vis recipients' needs.

¹¹ Regarding other factors affecting the dependent variable, quality of governance as measured by the WGI and GDP per capita have a significant negative influence on Swedish, UK, and US CPS aid commitments.

Table 3. Effects of time, conflict, and strategic interest on CPS aid commitments

DV: CPS aid Sample	Denmark				Sweden				UK				US			
	Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion	
	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.
Time	5.58E-09 3.47	9.37E-09 4.91	0.011 3.66	0.017 2.74	2.55E-08 8.40	3.18E-08 6.78	0.014 6.06	0.013 4.97	4.65E-08 10.95	5.39E-08 6.46	0.025 10.09	0.021 5.57	7.44E-08 7.29	8.99E-08 4.53	0.006 4.97	0.004 4.87
Conflict	2.95E-08 1.59		0.039 1.15		7.71E-08 2.68		0.025 1.14		9.05E-08 1.39		0.034 2.15		5.94E-07 3.47		-0.002 0.20	
Post-conflict	6.98E-08 2.75	3.53E-08 1.71	0.133 2.93	0.056 1.24	8.78E-08 2.22	2.70E-08 0.52	0.039 1.55	0.003 0.10	8.81E-08 2.38	1.04E-08 0.10	0.051 0.51	-0.016 0.32	3.43E-07 3.45	3.94E-07 1.56	0.047 2.03	0.036 2.00
Strategic interest	2.85E-08 2.80	-1.83E-09 0.18	0.058 3.09	0.018 0.75	3.79E-08 2.27	-3.14E-08 0.95	0.025 1.89	0.012 0.84	2.86E-07 4.77	9.34E-08 1.05	0.029 1.68	0.048 1.32	6.70E-07 3.94	6.29E-07 3.10	0.014 1.58	0.025 2.15
WGI	-1.65E-09 0.07	-7.13E-10 0.03	-0.021 0.44	-0.071 1.10	-7.49E-09 0.21	-1.76E-07 3.01	-0.002 0.06	0.032 0.78	-1.08E-07 2.77	-1.76E-07 1.20	0.037 0.93	0.014 0.20	-6.11E-08 0.47	-7.78E-07 2.32	-0.039 2.25	-0.007 0.32
PPPpc (log)	-1.32E-08 0.87	2.13E-09 0.15	-0.045 1.36	-0.064 0.84	-7.39E-08 3.22	-1.51E-07 4.20	-0.030 1.07	-0.050 1.66	7.99E-09 0.52	-1.21E-07 1.65	0.027 0.02	0.003 0.08	-3.86E-08 0.88	-1.42E-07 0.97	-0.034 1.68	0.008 0.64
Imports (log)	-5.61E-09 1.24	-4.84E-09 0.91	-0.005 0.55	-0.005 0.43	6.45E-09 0.90	-9.89E-09 0.90	-0.012 1.37	-0.008 0.82	8.34E-08 3.63	-6.28E-08 1.80	0.013 0.04	-0.017 0.87	8.40E-08 1.39	3.46E-08 0.62	-0.005 0.82	-0.005 0.66
Exports (log)	-3.52E-09 0.35	1.29E-08 1.13	-0.003 0.13	0.032 0.46	3.49E-08 2.63	7.42E-08 3.75	0.042 3.04	0.039 1.75	-1.15E-07 4.03	2.22E-07 4.31	0.019 0.24	0.024 0.85	-3.70E-09 0.04	2.24E-07 1.96	-0.010 1.38	0.004 0.65
Population (log)	8.57E-10 0.07	-6.92E-09 0.60	0.00 0.10	-0.03 0.49	-8.06E-08 4.21	-2.00E-07 6.71	-0.052 1.99	-0.055 2.39	-1.40E-07 1.97	-1.49E-07 1.74	0.018 1.03	-0.03601 1.25	-7.19E-07 3.19	-6.00E-07 3.54	0.025 2.23	-0.020 1.69
Colony	4.39E-09 0.19	-3.01E-08 1.39	0.016 0.31	-0.014 0.17	-3.06E-07 6.34		-0.045 0.88	0.003 0.04	-3.65E-07 2.93		0.044 0.77	0.023 0.48	-5.54E-07 1.51	-0.046 1.72	0.007 2.70	
N	481	209	481	209	666	290	666	290	798	304	798	304	843	302	843	270

The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at $p < 0.10$. Regressions controlled also for region and time effects.

Table 4. Change over time in democratisation and CPS aid commitments to conflict-affected compared to non-conflict-affected states

Time x conflict-affectedness				
	Democratisation aid		CPS aid	
	Per capita	Proportion	Per capita	Proportion
Denmark	NS	↓	↑	↑
Sweden	NS	NS	NS	↓
UK	↑	NS	NS	NS
US	NS	NS	NS	↓

NS: no significant change

↑: statistically significant increase in conflict-affected states as compared to non-conflict affected ones

↓: statistically significant reduction in conflict-affected states as compared to non-conflict-affected ones

Based on results displayed in full in Table 7 in the Appendix

Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix contain the results of a robustness test where the data were averaged first across two-year and second across four-year periods. The results for the key variables are in both direction and significance very similar to those attained with three-year averaged data in Table 2, supporting the overall validity of our findings.

The impact of donors' strategic interest (hypotheses 3 and 4)

The results presented thus far do not provide robust support for the securitisation of development aid in line with the policy discourse. Our next step in the analysis examined whether within the pool of conflict-affected countries the securitisation of aid was more apparent among those of greater strategic interest for donors.

Table 5. Change over time in the effect of strategic interest on democratisation and CPS aid commitments to conflict-affected countries

	Time x strategic interest			
	<i>Democratisation aid</i>		<i>CPS aid</i>	
	Per capita	Proportion	Per capita	Proportion
Denmark	NS	↓	NS	NS
Sweden	NS	NS	NS	NS
UK	↑	NS	NS	↑
US	↓	NS	↓	↓


NS: no significant change

↑: statistically significant increase in conflict-affected states as compared to non-conflict affected ones

↓: statistically significant reduction in conflict-affected states as compared to non-conflict-affected ones

Based on results displayed in full in Table 8 in the Appendix

Figure 3. Selected results from the interaction between time and donors' strategic interests in conflict-affected states



Based on the results of regressions displayed in Table 8

Table 5, along with results in Table 10 in the Appendix, demonstrate that the hypotheses are corroborated particularly for the UK, which has over time increasingly favoured conflict-affected countries of higher strategic importance in the allocation of both democratisation and CPS aid. This was also the case for the US and Denmark (regarding democratisation aid) until the last decade, when the importance of strategic interest in aid commitments to conflict-affected countries gradually declined to insignificance. In Sweden, there has been no significant relationship between strategic interest and democratisation and CPS aid commitments to conflict-affected states throughout the whole time period. Figure 3 displays some of the most significant results from Table 10.

Donor differences

Development policy discourse reflects securitisation most notably in the US and UK and least in Sweden. Aid commitments have to some extent mirrored these differences, particularly when taking into account the strategic interest of some aid-recipient countries to the donors. Only the UK increased the provision of democratisation aid faster in conflict-affected countries than elsewhere and only Denmark did so vis-à-vis CPS aid. However, when considering the recipients' strategic interest, UK aid appears to reflect the securitisation of development to a greater degree than the other three donors (with strategic interest having a greater influence on US and Danish aid up until the last decade). Swedish aid commitments, in line with policy discourse, have shown little sign of securitisation.

Is development aid securitised?

This study has investigated the extent to which development aid has become securitised, in line with the policy discourse, which has increasingly emphasised the importance of investing in democratisation and CPS activities in order to reduce conflict and build peaceful societies in the Global South.¹²

The results indicate that over the past two decades there has been a re-alignment of donors' sector priorities across the Global South. All four donors increased over time both the per-capita and proportional amount of development aid committed to conflict, peace, and security activities; the UK and Sweden also did so with democratisation aid. The proportional increase in aid provision to conflict, peace, and security and to democratisation activities implies the reduction of relative aid to other sectors.

However, the policy discourse holds that democratisation and CPS aid is crucial in conflict-affected states, where restoration of peace is key to both development and to wider security. There is a gap, therefore, between donors' discourse and their practice. None of the donors has provided more democratisation aid to conflict-affected countries than to states not affected by conflict. On its own this could arguably relate to issues of absorption capacity in conflict-affected states, but the proportional provision of democratisation aid did not grow faster in conflict-affected states than in non-conflict-affected states. Similarly, although conflict-affected states received cumulatively more conflict, peace, and security aid in the past two decades than more peaceful states, only Denmark augmented commitments of such aid more rapidly in conflict-affected countries. Consequently, by 2015 only Denmark was still channelling significantly more CPS aid to conflict-affected states than to

¹²As discussed, although the Swedish rationale differs from the other donors, their suggested approach to conflict-affected states in development assistance is similar.

countries not affected. These results may reflect the strong and pervasive nature of the security–development nexus as a way for donors to frame development interventions; in attempting to manage the perceived long-term risks associated with weak governance and poverty, donors seek to strengthen security sectors in states that have not (yet) experienced conflict.

Within the group of conflict-affected and post-conflict states, some are of more strategic importance to the donors than others, based on the ‘level of threat’ posed. For example, our data suggest that for both the US and the UK, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia have held the highest strategic interest and Chad, Mali and Papua New Guinea the lowest. We hypothesised that the securitisation of development aid may be more apparent in such states. Indeed, with the exception of Sweden, strategic interest seems to have played a significant role in donors’ decisions regarding aid allocation by sector. This difference between our non-NATO donor (Sweden) and NATO donors (US, UK, and Denmark) may be a reflection of the distinct ways in which states seek to have global influence and the type of power they use to further their interests.

The data also show some differences among the NATO donors. Until late 2000s, Denmark and the US were committing significantly more democratisation aid and the US also more CPS aid to conflict-affected countries of higher strategic importance. These positive relationships between recipients’ strategic importance and aid flows disappeared by about 2010, however. In contrast, while the UK’s democratisation and CPS aid commitments were not initially affected by the strategic interest of aid recipients, this changed by 2010.

One plausible explanation for these results are changes in donor governments. The Conservative governments in the UK, in power since 2010, have strongly connected overseas conflict with domestic insecurity (e.g. DFID, 2015). This may have translated into preferential allocation of democratisation and CPS aid to strategically important conflict-affected states. Meanwhile, the US and Denmark may have ceased to give preference in the provision of democratisation and CPS aid to strategically more important countries under the influence of more liberal or left-leaning governments (in the US Democrats after 2008, in Denmark Social Democrats after 2011).

The implication that left-leaning governments are less likely to engage in securitised aid disbursements chimes with previous research. Brown (2016, 2018) concluded that in Canada, the aid commitments of conservative governments were more aligned with national interest than those of liberal governments. Similarly, Fleck and Kilby (2006) found that US aid disbursements were more likely to reflect what they termed ‘development concerns’, as opposed to national security concerns, in times of Democratic Congress, while Brech and Potrafke (2014) arrived at a similar conclusion for

23 OECD countries' aid flows.¹³ While this article has not set out to examine the influence of donor governments on aid-securitisation trends, our findings highlight the impact of a donor's domestic politics on the role that securitisation of development plays in aid allocation (e.g. Brown, 2016) and indicate that at least in three of the four case-study countries, conservative governments have aligned aid provision with their perceived national security interests to a greater degree than liberal or left-leaning governments.

Conclusion

Through a detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis, this article furthers our understanding of the securitisation of development in a number of ways. We can conclude not only that aggregate aid flows broadly reflect security concerns, which is already established in the literature, but that securitisation has affected sector aid priorities across four key donor countries. However, we have also demonstrated that securitisation has had a different impact on different donors and indeed on different donor governments, depending on their political persuasion, and that a donor's perception of recipients in terms of strategic interest also plays a role. This heterogeneous, rather than homogenising, impact of securitisation on aid flows should be taken into account in future investigations of the securitisation of development.

More specifically, our results show that while donors have re-aligned their sector priorities in recipient countries in favour of democratisation and conflict, peace, and security aid, this trend had not focused specifically on conflict-affected states, which according to the policy discourse of the UK, US, and Denmark present a risk to their security. Instead, the most significant aspect of this changing preference may be the increase in the provision of CPS aid to countries not affected by conflict. The CRS project-level database suggests that security-sector reform in non-conflict countries in particular has received a significant funding boost in the last decade, despite concerns that aid allocated to the security sector can undermine democracy (Elhawary, 2010).

Further, our findings suggest that right-leaning donor governments tend to channel more democracy and CPS aid to conflict-affected countries of higher strategic interest than left-leaning or liberal governments. While this finding aligns with broader research, it prompts further investigation into the interplay between domestic politics and the securitisation of development, as well as into the consequences of this trend for both strategically more and less conflict-affected states. Evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan, which have received most democratisation and CPS aid per capita from major donors in recent history, suggests that a sustained democratic peace does not necessarily

13 However, research on this topic is not unanimous – e.g. Dreher et al. (2015) found socialist governments' aid provision in Germany to be at least as self-interested as conservative governments'.

result from significant aid investments in democratisation and CPS activities (Howard, 2015). On the other hand, because conflict-affected countries of low strategic importance generally receive not only less CPS and democratisation aid from donors but less development aid in general, their populations may experience even greater suffering, compounded with near invisibility in Western media – as the examples of Central African Republic or Yemen attest.

In conclusion, the impact of the securitisation of development on aid commitments is nuanced, with a differentiated impact on aid to different states depending on their conflict status, their strategic interest to the donor, and the character of the donor government. In light of the increase in CPS aid to countries not affected by conflict, we suggest further research into both the reasons underlying this shift and into its effect on recipient countries. Further, in view of the possible connection between conservative government donors and the provision of democratisation and CPS aid to strategically more important conflict-affected countries, future research should examine more closely the donor countries' decision-making processes regarding sector-aid allocation and explore the effects that such skewed aid commitments have on both more and less strategically important conflict-affected countries.

First submitted May 2018

Final draft accepted January 2019

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Table 6. Summary statistics of control variables

<i>Control variables</i>								
WGI	-0.51	0.56	-1.98	1.12	-0.45	0.61	-1.69	1.20
GDPpc (PPP, USD)	4370	3888	247	22772	8488	7458	641	41186
Four donor exports (mill USD)	707.0	1500	2.35	9140	1220	3120	1.00	23900
Four donor imports (mill USD)	545.0	1160	0.04	6560	1610	4040	0.60	28700
Population (mill)	33.80	111.0	0.22	980.0	35.00	120.0	0.02	1300
Colony	0.77	0.42	0.00	1.00	0.77	0.42	0.00	1.00
EE&CA	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
ME&NA	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00
SSA	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00
Caribbean	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00
C&SA	0.15	0.35	0.00	1.00	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
Asia (rest)	0.13	0.34	0.00	1.00	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
Pacific	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00	0.06	0.23	0.00	1.00
No. of countries	122				137			

Table 7. The temporal change in the effect of conflict-affectedness on democratisation and CPS aid commitments

Donor	Denmark				Sweden			
	<i>CPS</i>		<i>Democratisation</i>		<i>CPS</i>		<i>Democratisation</i>	
	<i>Per capita</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Per capita</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Per capita</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Per capita</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
Time	4.95E-09 2.21	0.009 2.21	1.93E-08 3.42	0.034 7.18	4.20E-09 1.42	0.016 7.61	7.04E-09 1.16	0.005 1.50
Conflict-affected	-7.80E-06 1.07	-13.596 1.26	-1.22E-05 0.70	8.575 0.60	-1.19E-05 1.53	8.113 1.40	-6.24E-05 3.35	3.208 0.29
Time x conflict-affected	3.92E-09 1.27	0.007 1.28	6.05E-09 0.94	-0.004 1.41	5.94E-09 2.35	-0.004 1.22	3.11E-08 1.18	-0.002 0.44
<i>N</i>	481				666			
Donor	UK				US			
	<i>CPS</i>		<i>Democratisation</i>		<i>CPS</i>		<i>Democratisation</i>	
	<i>Per capita</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Per capita</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Per capita</i>	<i>Proportion</i>	<i>Per capita</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
Time	5.41E-08 8.77	0.029 1.02	-1.49E-08 0.91	0.008 3.86	8.44E-08 6.13	0.007 5.57	3.79E-08 1.27	-0.004 2.55
Conflict-affected	1.90E-05 1.05	21.912 2.57	-1.88E-04 3.23	-8.183 1.05	2.58E-05 0.62	3.914 0.99	-2.34E-04 1.38	-6.307 1.14
Time x conflict-affected	-9.41E-09 1.00	-0.011 2.06	9.41E-08 2.56	0.004 0.58	-1.28E-08 0.82	-0.002 0.86	1.16E-08 0.56	0.003 1.25
<i>N</i>	798				843			

The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at $p < 0.10$. Regressions controlled also for region, time effects, and all the control variables listed in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 8. The temporal change in the effect of donors' strategic interests on democratisation and CPS aid commitments in conflict-affected countries

Donor	Denmark				Sweden			
	CPS		Democratisation		CPS		Democratisation	
	Per capita	Proportion	Per capita	Proportion	Per capita	Proportion	Per capita	Proportion
Time	3.36E-09	0.020	1.56E-08	0.051	7.52E-08	0.023	5.90E-08	0.021
	2.22	2.47	1.37	5.07	4.56	2.98	2.09	1.66
Strategic interest	-8.08E-06	-10.145	-5.19E-06	28.401	3.26E-05	7.747	2.38E-05	13.231
	2.96	1.38	0.45	2.82	2.62	1.34	1.13	1.38
Time x strat. int.	4.03E-09	0.005	-7.26E-10	-0.014	-1.63E-08	-0.004	-1.41E-08	-0.007
	1.96	1.38	0.12	2.59	1.68	0.96	1.34	1.45
N	209				290			
Donor	UK				US			
	CPS		Democratisation		CPS		Democratisation	
	Per capita	Proportion	Per capita	Proportion	Per capita	Proportion	Per capita	Proportion
Time	4.83E-08	0.013	9.42E-09	0.023	2.06E-07	0.006	3.42E-07	-0.003
	2.39	1.86	0.16	2.43	3.06	1.94	1.73	0.56
Strategic interest	-5.32E-06	-6.048	-0.0000513	8.472	9.49E-05	1.156	1.15E-04	-2.055
	0.34	1.07	0.92	1.12	1.74	0.37	0.70	0.43
Time x strat. int.	2.64E-09	0.003	2.58E-08	-0.004	-4.71E-08	-0.001	-1.00E-07	0.001
	1.24	1.12	1.05	1.62	2.00	0.56	1.96	0.35
N	304				305			

The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at $p < 0.10$. Regressions controlled also for region, time effects, and all the control variables listed in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 9. Sensitivity analysis of regressions from Table 2

DV: democratisation aid Sample	Denmark								Sweden							
	Two-year averaged data				Four-year averaged data				Two-year averaged data				Four-year averaged data			
	Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion	
	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.
Time	2.51E-08	2.96E-08	0.027	0.024	2.53E-08	2.73E-08	0.032	0.025	1.46E-08	2.72E-08	0.003	0.002	1.13E-08	1.97E-08	0.001	0.000
	4.60	4.26	7.98	4.70	5.48	3.76	7.42	4.36	3.38	4.70	1.13	0.68	2.46	3.00	0.27	0.03
Conflict	-5.05E-08		-0.068		8.22E-09		-0.076		8.46E-09		-0.063		1.61E-08		-0.069	
	0.69		1.39		0.12		1.26		0.14		1.70		0.22		1.53	
Post-conflict	-8.81E-08	-9.91E-08	-0.102	0.009	-1.06E-07	-1.35E-07	-0.113	0.056	-2.48E-09	-7.64E-08	-0.110	-0.058	8.05E-08	1.26E-08	-0.083	-0.029
	0.95	1.18	1.69	0.15	1.16	1.25	1.41	0.68	0.04	1.08	2.51	1.49	0.89	0.13	1.41	0.53
Strategic interest	2.88E-08	4.31E-08	-0.018	0.031	3.15E-08	6.51E-08	0.002	0.019	2.13E-08	-6.25E-08	-0.014	-0.039	4.10E-08	2.11E-08	-0.003	-0.006
	0.71	0.89	0.69	0.93	1.06	1.24	0.07	0.51	0.61	1.27	0.70	1.45	1.09	0.33	0.11	0.19
N	595	282	595	282	370	179	370	179	890	406	890	406	489	231	489	231
DV: democratisation aid Sample	UK								US							
	Two-year averaged data				Four-year averaged data				Two-year averaged data				Four-year averaged data			
	Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion	
	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.	All	Conf.-aff.
Time	2.53E-08	7.28E-08	0.010	0.014	1.48E-08	6.04E-08	0.008	0.011	9.68E-08	2.37E-07	-0.001	0.000	8.43E-08	2.12E-07	-0.003	0.000
	2.08	5.14	5.51	5.56	1.04	3.22	4.89	4.51	4.19	4.57	1.26	0.17	2.84	3.22	1.93	0.26
Conflict	-1.97E-08		-0.031		9.32E-08		-0.024		8.41E-07		-0.016		1.25E-06		-0.026	
	0.10		1.17		0.40		0.87		2.74		0.89		2.49		1.13	
Post-conflict	1.54E-07	-1.51E-07	-0.012	-0.021	9.09E-08	-3.89E-07	-0.023	-0.039	-6.69E-08	-8.62E-07	-0.034	-0.049	-7.61E-07	-2.32E-06	-0.028	-0.044
	0.65	0.83	0.36	0.66	0.29	1.28	0.60	1.05	0.18	1.34	1.52	2.52	1.20	2.27	0.92	1.62
Strategic interest	7.32E-09	1.50E-07	0.019	-0.007	-3.98E-08	4.67E-08	0.024	-0.004	-2.43E-07	2.14E-07	0.000	0.011	-3.09E-07	2.42E-07	-0.008	-0.005
	0.60	1.01	1.04	0.27	0.25	0.22	1.30	0.17	1.08	0.46	0.04	0.72	0.93	0.33	0.54	0.27
N	1082	433	1082	433	581	246	581	246	1140	436	1140	436	595	242	595	242

The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at $p < 0.10$. Regressions controlled also for region, time effects, and all the control variables listed in Tables 2 and 3.

Table 10. Sensitivity analysis of regressions from Table 3

	Denmark								Sweden							
	Two-year averaged data				Four-year averaged data				Two-year averaged data				Four-year averaged data			
DV: CPS aid	Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion	
Sample	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.
Time	8.00E-09	1.63E-09	0.015	0.015	6.39E-09	7.54E-09	0.002	0.002	1.96E-08	8.50E-09	0.012	0.013	4.12E-09	8.20E-09	0.011	0.012
	3.82	1.69	4.07	3.02	3.50	3.54	3.85	2.78	6.96	2.76	5.98	6.07	4.24	2.31	6.85	5.32
Conflict	1.31E-09		0.022		7.79E-09		-0.004		2.24E-08		0.013		1.98E-08		0.025	
	1.28		0.55		0.41		0.12		0.70		0.69		0.71		1.17	
Post-conflict	1.83E-08	1.15E-08	0.051	0.014	4.48E-08	-4.29E-08	0.073	0.011	7.65E-08	3.67E-08	0.042	0.010	5.87E-08	2.24E-08	0.033	-0.004
	2.23	1.37	1.67	0.25	1.85	1.50	2.06	0.65	1.78	1.17	2.08	0.42	1.80	0.52	1.77	0.13
Strategic interest	4.91E-08	2.60E-09	0.065	0.034	4.08E-08	3.05E-08	0.047	0.010	3.62E-08	2.63E-08	0.024	0.011	2.02E-08	1.23E-08	0.015	0.006
	3.59	1.49	2.76	1.12	4.04	2.36	1.98	1.26	1.73	1.27	2.31	0.71	1.72	0.43	1.85	0.31
N	595	282	595	282	370	179	370	179	890	406	890	406	489	231	489	231

	UK								US							
	Two-year averaged data				Four-year averaged data				Two-year averaged data				Four-year averaged data			
DV: CPS aid	Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion		Per capita		Proportion	
Sample	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.	All	Conf.-off.
Time	5.34E-08	5.96E-08	0.023	0.020	4.45E-08	4.92E-08	0.017	0.015	6.96E-08	9.08E-08	0.005	0.004	6.58E-08	9.00E-08	0.005	0.005
	11.38	7.28	11.39	7.85	9.29	5.80	9.68	6.40	7.19	4.82	6.26	5.02	6.44	4.70	5.5	4.74
Conflict	1.59E-07		0.044		2.02E-07		0.042		2.08E-07		-0.006		3.38E-07		-0.008	
	3.06		1.92		3.26		1.86		1.74		0.54		2.40		0.60	
Post-conflict	1.41E-07	6.65E-08	0.044	0.015	1.61E-07	9.87E-08	0.058	0.043	6.07E-07	4.70E-07	0.026	0.023	2.35E-07	3.71E-10	0.022	0.019
	2.11	0.70	0.47	0.53	1.99	0.84	1.95	1.33	3.81	2.07	1.88	2.27	1.23	0.00	1.68	1.36
Strategic interest	5.20E-08	2.51E-08	0.044	0.018	7.95E-08	1.04E-07	0.045	0.036	3.46E-07	4.27E-07	0.020	0.009	2.49E-07	4.93E-07	0.012	0.013
	1.53	0.29	2.48	0.75	1.70	1.15	2.61	1.48	3.76	2.37	2.40	1.66	2.52	2.71	1.35	1.42
N	1082	433	1082	433	581	246	581	246	1140	436	1140	436	595	242	595	242

The first number next to each variable is the coefficient, with the corresponding t statistic/Z score below. Numbers in bold are significant at least at $p < 0.10$. Regressions controlled also for region, time effects, and all the control variables listed in Tables 2 and 3.

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